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 In this paper we will look at how the Albanian foreign policy has evolved, since 
1992 in light of its security concerns. To achieve this we will focus at Albania’s foreign 
policy toward the question of Kosova, Macedonia and Greece. We will be looking at both 
Democratic and Socialist Party policies.  
The Foreign Policy of the Democratic-led Government toward Kosova 
In stark contrast with the up to then attitude of the Communist authorities toward 
the national question, in post-communist Albania the national question became a foreign 
policy priority. What factors accounted for this dramatic change in Albanian stance? Due 
to the collapse of communism and democratic transformation that was occurring 
throughout the former communist block, Albania found itself better placed to support the 
cause of the ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia.  
 The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of Yugoslav wars had a two-
fold effect on Tirana. On the one hand, the isolation of Serbia, and its relegation to a 
pariah status provided a greater diplomatic space for Albania to assist Albanians in 
Kosova, on the other, it presented an ominous threat from Serbia. If the war spread to 
Kosova, then Albania would have, ultimately, been dragged into it as well. Such a 
development would have been chatastrophic for Albania whose “armed forces were 
grossly inadequate for the country’s defense”1 and in addition, was going through one of 
the most difficult periods in its history. A general situation of turmoil prevailed as the 
communist system was collapsing and the country was moving toward pluralism. The 
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internal security had been broken and the country was experiencing a severe economic 
and social dislocation that had reduced Albania to total dependence on foreign 
assistance.2 The avoidance of war became the overriding foreign policy objective. The 
cautious policy adopted by Tirana cannot be primarily attributed to Western and US 
pressure but to domestic and regional constraints that drastically limited its options.3 
Actually, what provided the US and the Albanian governments with the opportunity to 
develop a strategy that would prevent the spread of the war southward was the decision 
of the Albanians in Kosova to organise a non-violent movement.  
What we notice from these developments is the convergence of interests between 
the Albanian state and the Albanians in Kosova. In the past Albania had tried to enhance 
its security by not focusing on the national question and avoiding any action that would 
have been perceived as threatening by its neighbours, however, under the new 
circumstances this foreign policy line could no longer provide security.  
 The new national security strategy adopted by Albania had become more 
assertive. While stating that Albania recognised the inviolability of borders thus rejecting 
the idea of national unification and supporting a peaceful resolution of the problem, it 
also declare that if Serbia started its ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosova, Albanians 
would react as one nation which could lead to a larger Balkan war.4 This foreign policy 
stance was meant to serve two goals; to work as a deterrent against the Serbian threat and 
urged the US to become more involved in the region.  
The Christmas warning announced by President Bush in December 1992 and later 
confirmed by Clinton which threatened Serbia with military action, if it provoked a war 
in Kosova was an indication of the shared interests between the US and Albania in 
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preventing the southward spread of the war. In this contexts Albania and the Albanians 
provided the US and NATO with an important factor to maintain stability. For Albania 
the close association with the US and Western countries provided the government with 
the necessary security to focus on the question of the economic transformation. In 
addition, Albania pursued an active policy at the regional level with the aim of building 
an anti-Milosevic coalition.5 In these attempts it also tried to differentiate between 
Montenegro and Serbia. In all these endeavours, Albanian state closely coordinated its 
activities with the Kosova shadow government. This close cooperation at the institutional 
level strengthened the firmness of Albanians in Kosova to carry on their resistance in a 
peaceful way.6 
Despite the great progress that was made in the inter-Albanian cooperation, 
problems did exist. The relationship between Albania and Kosova, though conducted 
through institutional channels, had remained confined to two political forces, Democratic 
Party (DP) and the Democratic League of Kosova, (DLK) or even in between two 
individuals; Berisha and Rugova as some would say.7 DP and LDK did not try to reach 
out to other political forces in Albania and Kosova in order to establish a wider and open 
dialogue on the national question.8 This lack of consensus on the national question proved 
to be very costly for the Albanians when the crisis broke out. Rugova publicly supported 
Berisha and PD policies during national elections and the referendum on the constitution. 
This attitude undoubtedly increased the already existing gap between Rugova and the 
Socialist Party. Whereas Berisha, by strongly supporting Rugova and his peaceful 
policies, and by maintaining contacts only with him, contributed to the marginalisation of 
the other political figures in Kosova.9  
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Strong cooperation that developed between Albania and Kosova notwithstanding, 
Tirana was in no position to assist the Albanians in Kosova to achieve their 
independence. By supporting the Ghandian policies of Rugova, Albania had clearly 
indicated that its principle concern was the prevention of conflict. The endorsement of 
Kosova statehood would have exacerbated regional tensions and threatened the Albania’s 
security. Therefore, Albania declared that it would accept a solution that provided not 
less than the rights Albanians enjoyed under 1974 constitution. This stance of the 
Albanian government was adopted immediately after coming to power of Berisha in 
March 1992.10  
Until late 1996, Albanian foreign policy remained unchanged. It continued to 
support Rugova’s peaceful policy and it urged the US and Western countries to exercise 
pressure on Belgrade to initiate negotiations with Prishtina and restore autonomy so as to 
defuse tensions in the region. However, the political realities that had shaped Albania’s 
foreign policy in the early 1990s had changed significantly by 1996. The exclusion of 
Kosova from the peace negotiations in Dayton marked a serious setback to the efforts of 
Rugova and Berisha to bring about a settlement. In the wake of the Dayton Agreement 
the importance of Albania’s regional role decreased as the fighting in Bosnia ended and 
the threat of a spill over to the neighbouring countries subsided,11 while the position of 
Belgrade was strengthened since its support was deemed crucial for the peace accord in 
Bosnia.  
 In addition, the international image of Albania was tarnished after the 
controversial elections of May 1996. Albanian government came under international 
pressure, and the relations with the US, which had been remarkable until then, 
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deteriorated significantly.12 During all this period, Tirana’s policy toward Kosova 
continued to remain unchanged. It was only after the start of the opposition protests in 
Belgrade that we notice a change. Berisha called on the Albanians of Kosova to stage 
peaceful protests in support of the Serbian opposition arguing that the democratisation of 
Serbia was important for the resolution of the Kosova question.13 The novelty of this 
stand consisted of two things. In contrast to the previous cautious policy of Albania this 
was a bold move. Secondly, for the first time Berisha was openly challenging Rugova’s 
position, which maintained that the protests were an internal Serbian affair, and that there 
was no difference between Milosevic and the opposition. The rift between Berisha and 
Rugova became clear as the press in Kosova started attacking Berisha.14 Whether the 
move of Berisha marked the beginning of a more assertive policy by Albania is difficult 
to say due to the outbreak of the crisis in Albania.  
Albania’s Foreign Policy toward Macedonia 
 Although the disintegration of Yugoslavia further fragmented the Albanians in the 
Balkans, the establishment of an independent Macedonian state was in the interest of 
Albania and the Albanians in general. The decision of Macedonia not to remain in rump 
Yugoslavia weakened Serb regional standing and separated Greece and Serbia. In 
addition, both countries shared similar interests. They were being squeezed by the 
Greeco-Serb axis and could offset some of the pressure by developing close economic 
and political ties.15 Due to these considerations Tirana strongly supported Macedonia’s 
stability and independence, and urged the Albanians of Macedonia to work toward this 
end. While Albania showed interest in the welfare of the ethnic Albanians the issue was 
not the main factor shaping bilateral relations. As we trace the development of Albanian-
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Macedonian relations we notice that the overriding security concern – stability of 
Macedonia – prevailed over other concerns.16 Tirana (and the Kosovar leadership) did not 
support the move of the Albanians in Macedonia for territorial autonomy afraid that this 
would trigger Serbian intervention.  
 During Gligorov’s visit to Albania in June 1992 Berisha supported the Albanians’ 
demand for constituent nation’s status in Macedonia, and linked the recognition of 
Macedonia with the latter’s respect for Albanians rights there. Following the meeting, the 
economic relations between the two countries intensified. The transportation of oil 
through Albania was made possible and in December Berisha and Gligorov met again on 
the occasion of the opening of new border points. These contacts indicated that Albania 
had de facto recognised Macedonia.17 De jure recognition was extended immediately 
after the UN recognition of Macedonia in April 1993, notwithstanding Macedonian 
authorities failure to address any of the Albanian grievances. Albania’s position was 
reversed because Tirana thought that the recognition of Macedonia would improve the 
relations between the two countries thus creating the necessary conditions for solving the 
status of Albanians in Macedonia.18 A similar change in policy occurred on the issue of 
Macedonia’s membership in OSCE that had been vetoed by Albania and Greece.  
 At the end of 1993 the relations between the two countries experienced, for a brief 
period, deterioration due to the occurrence of two events. Macedonian authorities 
announced that they had discovered a paramilitary organisation that had connections with 
Tirana. Considering the Albanian policy toward Kosova and Macedonia such allegations 
sounded very absurd. In its policy toward the Kosova question, primary concern of 
Albania was to avoid a conflict with Serbia. The same thing held true for Macedonia, 
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which was illustrated by the continuous call on the Albanians in Macedonia to become a 
stabilising factor in Macedonia. Moreover, according to this allegations Albania had 
decided to create trouble in Macedonia at the end of 1993, after Macedonia had been 
admitted to the UN, and also after the US troops had been stationed there, and a number 
of European countries had established diplomatic relations with Macedonia. Following 
the incident Albanian Defence Minister and his Macedonian counterpart tried to 
minimise the importance of the event.  
 The second event, which was seen as hardening of the Albanian stance toward 
Macedonia, was Tirana’s involvement in the split of the party for Democratic Prosperity 
(PDP).19 The PDP had been suffering from internal dissent over the strategy to be 
employed in order to achieve the party’s goals. A faction composed of the cabinet and 
parliament members supported participation in the government as the best way to achieve 
the Albanians’ goals. Whereas the other group, led by Menduh Thaci and Arben Xhaferi, 
maintained that participation in government without any progress toward meeting 
Albanian grievances had weakened the bargaining position of the Albanians. In 
December 1993 the PDP leadership resigned. Tirana had openly supported Xhaferi and 
Thaci section. In the national congress in February 1994 the party split into two. The 
move by Albania brought about a strong reaction from Skopje. Careful observation of the 
event and subsequent developments should raise a few questions in one’s mind.  
 The differentiation of political forces in Macedonia by analysts between moderate 
and radical had been in vogue until the elections of 1998, though such political categories 
did not always reflect the reality. After the split of PDP, both groups kept the Party’s 
program and statutes.20 The use of labels, such as nationalist and moderate, benefited the 
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ruling forces in government. Secondly, the event gives the impression as if the key to 
understanding and controlling developments concerning Albanians outside Albania 
resides in Tirana. This image has also been reinforced by the way in which Western 
diplomacy in the region has been conducted. It has focused on Albania and Berisha 
instead of turning their attention to the local Albanian leaders in Macedonia and their 
grievances.21 Lastly, was there really a shift in Albania’s policy toward Macedonia? In 
February Greece imposed an embargo on Macedonia. That combined with the UN 
embargo on Yugoslavia, proved disastrous for the Macedonian economy. At this difficult 
situation Albania (and Bulgaria) provided Macedonia with alternative trade routes22 
without trying to capitalise on Macedonia’s weakness. This clearly illustrated that the 
overriding security concern of Albania – stability of Macedonia – remained the same. 
 In May Berisha met with Gligorov for informal talks. The meeting focused 
primarily on how to increase economic cooperation between the two countries, and 
extend communication and transportation links. Berisha praised Gligorov for the steps 
taken to enlarge the middle school system, Albanian language media and the decision to 
hold the population census. The attitude of Albania toward Macedonia did not change 
even after the incident following the establishment of the Albanian University in Tetova. 
While Tirana recognised and supported the university its reaction toward Skopje was 
restrained.23  
Although the relations between Macedonian authorities and the Albanians in 
Macedonia provided considerable room for intervention Tirana did not exploit it.24 The 
stability of Macedonia, not the ethnic ties was and still is the main factor that has shaped 
Albanian-Macedonian relations. Fully aware of this25 and the constraints under which 
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Albanian foreign policy operated due to the Kosovo question and the problematic 
relationship with Greece, Macedonian authorities did not have to make concessions to 
Albanians at home in order to maintain relations with Tirana at a satisfactory level. Apart 
from geostrategic considerations the attitude of Tirana toward Skopje has also been 
influenced by the way the Tirana perceives the problem of Albanians of Macedonia. For 
the Albanian political class it is Kosova that constitutes what we know as the Albanian 
national question, whereas the case of Macedonia is seen as “one of equal rights within 
the existing state.”26   
The policy of the Democratic Government toward Greece 
Relations between Tirana and Athens constitute a very important and complex 
dimension that has always demanded the special attention and energies of the Albanian 
government. The Albanian public opinion too, as a result of the large number of Albanian 
emigrant workers in Greece, has been much more interested on this dimension over other 
foreign policy issues. The relations between the two have also necessitated the 
intervention of international actors to reduce the tensions.  
The Democratic government that emerged after the 1992 elections was very much 
interested in having good relations with its southern neighbor. Albania was going through 
a very difficult transition; the economy was in ruins and the country faced serious 
security threats due to the outbreak of the conflict in Yugoslavia. The immigration of 
hundreds of thousands of Albanians to Greece relieved some of the transition pains by 
reducing unemployment and helping the economic recovery through their annual 
remittances. As the only Balkan country being member of EU and NATO, Greek political 
support was also important for Albania’s integration into the Western institutions. In 
 10 
addition, the danger of the Yugoslav conflict moving to Albanian inhabited territories 
required that that Tirana maintained good relations with neighboring countries. However, 
despite this positive disposition of Albania, relations between the two remained 
problematic until the middle of 1995. The reasons accounting for this state of affairs can 
be found in the aims of the Greek government toward Albania and the region as well as 
in the means employed to achieve these goals. 
Greek policy in the early 1990s was affected by strong forces of nationalism.  
Greece tried to establish itself as a leading regional power that could impose its terms on 
others. To this end it pursued an aggressive foreign policy as illustrated by the measures 
that it adopted against Macedonia and Albania. Another factor that had a negative impact 
on bilateral relations and increased Tirana’s suspicions was the development of the 
Greeco-Serb axis. The very strong and constant pro-Serb stance of Athens was indicative 
of different and opposing national interests between Albania and Greece.  
The policy of Greece toward Albania is embodied in the phrase: “Albania’s road 
to Europe goes via Athens”. However, Greece lacked the resources to play this special 
role. In 1994 trade with Greece composed only 14% of the overall trade relations, while 
Greek investments only 15% of the total foreign investments in Albania. Italy was ahead 
of Greece in both of these indicators. Even in terms of the economic aid Greece was 
behind Italy, United States and Germany.27 Although the remittances of the Albanian 
refugees constitute a significant contribution to the GNP, which enhances Athens’ 
importance, Greece too, benefits a lot from Albania emigrant workers. They provide a 
cheap labor force and their Greek employers save money by not paying their social 
security benefits. In addition, the Albanians’ savings in Greek banks provide capital for 
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investments in the Greek economy. The economic growth that is witnessed in Northern 
Greece in the last decade can be attributed to a large extent to the cheap Albanian labor 
force and trade relations between Northern Greek regions and Albania. In addition to 
economic benefits, Greece has turned the Albanian refugees into a powerful foreign 
policy instrument, which is used whenever Greece is not pleased with the attitude of the 
Albanian Government. The deportation of Albanians constitutes the most effective 
instrument that Greece possesses toward Albania. By returning the refugees Greece not 
only put pressure on the Albanian economy but also created new cleavages in the 
Albanian political system. The left-wing opposition adopted a more conciliatory attitude 
toward Greece hoping that it would attract the vote of those families that were directly 
affected by the deportation policies and tensions between Tirana and Athens. Yet at the 
same time, such Greek policies have also increased anti-Greek feelings among the 
Albanian population. Turning again to the issue of Athens’ goal that Tirana accepts its 
positions. Because of different national interests and the general situation of turmoil that 
existed in the Balkans, Tirana could not fall into the Greek foreign policy line. Contrary 
to the policies of Athens, Albania recognized Macedonia in early 1993 and during the 
Greek imposed embargo provided Macedonia with alternative trade routes. Greece was 
also distressed by the deepening political and military relationship of Albania with United 
States and Turkey, which narrowed its room to maneuver.28 
The safeguarding of the Greek minority rights constitutes another objective of 
Greece in Albania. As a mother country Greece has naturally an interest in the well being 
of the minority. Greek officials have declared time after time that the improvement of 
bilateral relations depends on respect for the minority rights. The bilateral disputes 
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between Greece and Albania have always had, at least as officially stated reason, the 
maltreatment of the Greek minority. A brief look at the Albanian history shows that 
unlike other Balkan countries, minorities in Albania have not experienced periods of 
repression, forced assimilation or ethnic cleansing. Two main factors account for this 
positive legacy. As a result of the small size of the minorities, even the Greek minority 
that is more visible is estimated at around 100,00029 constituting close to 3% of the 
population, minorities are not perceived by the Albanians as a threat to their control over 
the state. Second, inter-ethnic tolerance in Albania is directly connected to inter-religious 
tolerance of which Albania provides a unique example not only in the Balkans but even 
beyond. Greek minority is fully integrated in the Albanian political, economic and social 
life, as it is confirmed also in the communication between the High Commissioner on 
National Minorities and the Albanian government.30 Considering Albania’s weak position 
vis-a-vis Greece; its quest for integration in the Western Institutions; and its efforts to 
internationalize the Kosova issue, Albania could not afford, even if it wanted, to pursue 
policies other than those that further integrated the Greek minority. Hence the concern for 
Greek minority in Albania has turned into a foreign policy instrument that Greece uses to 
bring pressure on the Albanian government similar to the one that we mentioned above; 
the deportation of Albanian refugees. The Albanians’ concern with the Greek demands 
on behalf of the Greek minority is that they have in the past - but also certain statements 
in the 1990s raised similar concerns - been associated with irredentist aims of Greece 
toward southern Albania or Northern Epirus as Greeks call it. Greece has always 
considered the acquisition of South Albania, as part of the fulfillment of the Megali Idea. 
During the Balkan Wars, First and Second World War Greece has tried to capture South 
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Albania. However, in each case the post-war settlement did not change the Albanian-
Greek border that was decided in the Protocol of Firence in December 1913. Since 1940 
Greece has been in a State of War with Albania following Italy’s attack against Greece 
from Albania though, Albania then, was no longer a sovereign country. Paradoxically the 
state of war between Albania and Greece continues to exist. Experts of International law 
say that the decision of Mr. Papandreou’s Socialist government in 1987 to lift the state of 
war against Albania is not juridical enough to invalidate the state of war because Greek 
parliament has never approved the act.31 The border issue between Greece and Albania 
should have been covered by the Helsinki Final Act on the inviolability of borders in 
Europe. Nevertheless, the lack of border pyramid between Greece and Albania testifies to 
the fact that Greece does not officially recognize the border with Albania. Greek policy 
toward Albania in the 1990s further increased Albanians fears regarding the ultimate 
aims of its southern neighbor. Athens has allowed the fierce anti-Albanian propaganda 
that is aired from the radio stations in Northern Greece by the Panhellenic Union of 
Northern Epirus Struggle, which calls for autonomy and secession of Northern Epirus 
(Southern Albania). Greece has tried and succeeded to some extent to bring the Albanian 
Autocephalous Orthodox Church under the control of the Greek Orthodox Church. The 
Greek Orthodox Exarch Anastasios Yanullatos has been declared as the new Archbishop 
by the Patriarch in Istanbul, though this is against the statuses of the Autocephalous 
Albanian church. The Greek Orthodox Church is known for its ultra-nationalist attitudes 
toward the Greek minority and Southern Albania.  
The first serious incident in the Albanian-Greek relations brings together almost 
all the elements that we mentioned above. In 1993 Albanian authorities deported a Greek 
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clergyman, who had been caught disseminating maps that showed half of the Albanian 
territory within the Greek borders. Athens immediately hit back by expelling tens of 
thousand of illegal Albanian migrant workers. As the relations deteriorated, in a 
statement by the Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis, among other demands, drew the 
parallel between Albanians in Kosova and the Greek minority in Albania. Whatever 
status Albanians demanded for Albanians in Kosova should be granted also to the Greek 
minority.32 Such a statement could only be seen as a manifestation of the Greeco-Serbian 
axis, aiming at keeping Albania off balance, thus being unable to pressurize Serbia over 
the Kosova issue. As a result of this Albania further increased its political and military 
cooperation with Turkey. Tirana also pointed to the lack of reciprocity in the bilateral 
relations. While the Greek minority was fully integrated in the political and social life of 
Albania Athens would not agree to address the issue of the Albanian Cham minority that 
had been expelled from Greece by the Greek armed forces at the end of the Second 
World War. Tirana also demanded the legalization of the Albanian migrant workers in 
Greece. Relations with Greece further deteriorated and reached their lowest point, in 
April 1994, after an attack on a conscript training center in which two Albanian soldiers 
were killed. The Albanian government blamed the attack on Greece and called for on the 
UN Security Council to condemn Greece for state terrorism. While Greece denied the 
attacks did not take any measures to curb the actions of the extremist organization.33 The 
Albanian government responded by arresting several members of the Greek organization 
Omonia, on charges of espionage and illegal possession of weapons. As counter measures 
Greece not only initiated a massive deportation of Albanian immigrants but also vetoed 
EU aid to Albania and was able to influence US decision regarding 30 million USD 
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funding, which was put on hold. Release of prisoners and improvement in the status of 
the Greek minority were put as conditions by Greece to normalize relations with Albania. 
The Albanian public opinion was divided between those that advocated a strong stance 
on one hand and the left-wing opposition that criticized the government for overreacting 
and damaging bilateral relations. At this point the US and EU became involved trying to 
defuse tensions. Following the release of the ethnic Greeks, relations improved 
considerably. A meeting between Albanian and Greek officials in March 1995 called on 
mutual assistance aimed at easing polemics and on joint action in rooting out the 
organization that had carried the action (MAVI). In 1996 during the visit of the Greek 
President Greece and Albania signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, 
Goodneighborliness and Security. Albanian government was aware of the importance of 
having good relations with Greece due to economic and political considerations. The 
improvement of bilateral relations reflected also a different Greek foreign policy toward 
the Balkans that had initiated with Prime Minister Costas Simitis. 
Misperceptions of each other’s intentions might have played a role in the 
escalating feud – Albanians’ suspicions that behind Greek demands for minority 
protection lied irredentist goals – however, unless Greece addresses the Cham problem 
Albanians will not be assured that Athens is genuinely interested in having good 
relations.  
Albania’s Foreign Policy toward Kosova during the Socialist-led Government   
Three main factors shaped Albanian foreign policy and account for its shift after 
Socialist took power. The need of Socialist-led coalition government to strengthen their 
position domestically. As a result of 1997 crisis the legitimacy of state institutions had 
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been severely damaged, the political scene was characterised by strong polarisation and 
the economy was in ruins. Against this background, no political force could have 
maintained power without the support of the West. It is in this context that we should 
understand Nano’s policy shift toward Kosovo.  
 In order to win the West’s support Nano presented himself as a moderate force 
that was charting a new course that was in contrast to the nationalistic policies of 
Berisha.34 As Nano put it in a report to the Parliament “our unwavering will to introduce 
into Albania Western political ethics and do away one by one with the concepts and the 
mentalities of the old and savage Balkans and Albanian policy.”35 However, as we have 
seen, Berisha had not pursued nationalist policies; he had maintained good relations with 
Macedonia even though the later had not addressed any of the Albanian grievances. In 
the case of Kosovo his primary concern had been to avoid the conflict. Although Berisha 
became a strong advocate of the Kosovo Albanians he did call for the restoration of 
autonomy and urged them to make compromises. Thus in order to differentiate his policy 
from the previous one Nano had to engage in spectacular acts like meeting Milosevic and 
abandoning all the principles on which Tirana-Prishtina cooperation was based.36 
 The second factor that shaped Albanian foreign policy was the close relationship 
that Tirana developed with Athens at the expense of other regional allies. According to 
many observers Nano was under strong Greek influence.37 Lastly, what made easier 
Nano’s policy shift was the lack of consensus that had existed on the national question. 
As we noted earlier, the cooperation between Albania and Kosova had developed 
exclusively between two political forces DP and DLK. The other political forces were not 
consulted on the policy that Tirana pursued on the national question. As a result Nano 
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could abandon the previous policy by identifying it with Berisha. In addition the 
continuous support that Rugova had given Berisha had  resulted in estrangement between 
him and the Socialist Party in Albania. As the events unfolded it became clear that a kind 
of alliance had developed between Nano and those, opposing Rugova in Prishtina.  
 The meeting between Nano and Milosevic during the Crete summit of the Balkan 
countries very well illustrates the new Albanian foreign policy. In a total policy reversal, 
Tirana had carried talks with Belgrade on Kosova when only the legitimate leaders of the 
Kosova Albanians were entitled to carry those talks. Similar to the meeting between 
Albanian and Yugoslav Foreign Ministers at the UN a month earlier, this meeting had 
taken place without consultations with the Kosovar Albanian leadership. Since Albania 
cannot play the role of the mother-state, Tirana cannot represent Kosovar Albanians and 
decide about their fate. For Nano the full observation of the human rights in Kosova and 
the application of democracy were seen as sufficient conditions to initiate a dialogue with 
Belgrade.38 Nano also called for direct contacts between Prishtina and Belgrade without 
the presence of a third party. The new policy had obviously changed from being a factor 
of support for Kosova Albanians to one of pressure. In line with this policy Nano 
criticised Kosovar parallel institutions saying that they were not a solution; on the 
contrary, they radicalised the societies that had created them.39 
The new policy of Tirane was strongly criticised by the Kosovar Albanians, 
which asked the “government in Tirana to give the same support as its predecessor” and 
reminded it that the “relations between Albania and Kosova is not one of a mother 
daughter country.”40 The contacts between Tirana and Prishtina had almost broken down.  
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 Despite criticisms at home Nano had won praise abroad. The Crete meeting had 
taken place with Athens’s blessing, which wanted to rehabilitate Milosevic.41 The 
Western countries too, had endorsed the meeting and gave their support to Nano.42 
 Even after the outbreak of war in Kosova, in March 1998, the government’s 
attitude remained restrained and ambivalent.43 While all the political forces in Albania 
including the Socialists joined a massive rally in Tirana in support of Kosova under the 
motto ‘one nation, one stand’ the government failed to adopt these as the main building 
block of its policy. Tirana’s demand for NATO troops to be deployed in the northeastern 
border to prevent a spillover into Albania clearly pointed to the lack of this principle. 
Tirana was trying to insulate itself from the crisis in Kosova. The government failed to 
formulate a policy of its own to present the Albanian view on Kosova. Rather it played 
the role of the obedient partner of the West.44 
 As fighting escalated in Kosova, during the May-June period, and the lack of 
intervention from the West, Nano toughened his rhetoric, as illustrated from one of his 
declarations that Albania was ‘on the eve of war’ with Yugoslavia and called for NATO 
intervention.45 However, the main driving force behind his policy had not changed. In 
Crans Montana Nano openly opposed independence for Kosova as not being the best way 
to end the fighting and suggested that the “right solution would be the creation of a 
democratic framework, be it a local parliament or administration”. His demand did not 
even match that of the international community that had asked for substantial autonomy. 
But what was more important than his pronouncement on the future status of Kosova was 
his attempt to establish himself as the only reliable and indispensable partner of the West. 
In Crans Montana Nano declared that Rugova had become a man without any authority, 
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while adding that he had ‘information that the KLA has the capacity and the authority to 
be included into a negotiation process, and that Tirana was ‘trying to contact every one 
possible on the ground with due influence to moderate KLA factions.46 
 The need to win West’s support in order to shore up his position at home, is the 
main driving force behind Nano’s foreign policy. Despite widespread corruption and 
marginalization of the opposition the West continued to support the Socialist led 
government.47 Following the violence that was sparked as a result of the assassination of 
Azem Hajdari, a leading Democratic party figure, Nano was forced to resign and was 
succeeded by Pandeli Majko. 
 The foreign policy pursued by Majko changed substantially from his 
predecessor’s. It became more assertive, and increased considerably his support for the 
Albanians in Kosova.48 The hardening of his stance has been described as a ‘return to the 
Balkan nation’s traditional line on Kosova’. Majko clearly stated that “Albania should 
not embark on the road of giving recipes” and that his government was formulating his 
policy according to this line.49 A week from the start of the bombing campaign and as the 
Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing was underway, Majko went as far as saying that 
“independence is an option that can be discussed very clearly now”.50 This was a bold 
statement considering the fact that NATO members were opposed to independence. The 
present official policy of the Socialist-led government is that it supports Kosovar 
Albanians will. In other words the independence of Kosova. 
The Foreign Policy of the Socialist-led Government toward Macedonia  
 The policy of the Socialist-led government toward Macedonia, similar to the 
Democratic party’s policy, continued to subordinate the ethnic ties to the security 
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concerns and maintenance of good relations. However, while the main contours of 
foreign policy remained the same the cooperation between the two contries received a 
boost, as was indicated, by the visit of Nano to Skopje and signing of eight agreements in 
the fields of justice, transportation, economy and finance. Following the outbreak of war 
in Kosova in March 1998, the countries increased their cooperation in the security area as 
well to prevent arms and drug trafficking and illegal border crossings.51 
 The same policy was followed by Majko, too, and did not change with the coming 
to power of a new coalition in Macedonia.  The cooperation between Albania, Macedonia 
and Montenegro increased during the Kosova crisis, as these countries were trying to 
avoid the destabilising effects of Milosevic’s policies, and cope with the refugee crisis.  
 
The Policy of the Socialist led Government toward Greece 
The crisis of 1997 changed dramatically Albania’s position and the nature of 
relationship with Greece. Tirana has accepted in a way the special role that Greece should 
play in the region. During the 1993-6 period Socialist party’s had been critical of 
Democratic Party’s policies toward Greece. In addition there existed contacts between 
PASOK and Socialist Party since 1993. This closeness was indicated by the permission 
that was given to Fatos Nano the leader of Socialist Party in 1997 to hold election rallies 
in several Greek cities where there are Albanian emigrants. The Greek government had 
clearly taken sides in Albanian election and as the course of events showed a deep 
cleavage had been created in its relations with the Democratic Party. After the Socialist 
took power the contacts between the two increased substantially and intensified in all 
areas. There were frequent visits of Greek officials in Tirana which were reciprocated by 
 21 
Albanian counterparts. Not only in the domestic scene but also in the foreign one Greece 
started to play a much more important role. Greece was asked to play the role of the third 
party between Kosova and Belgrade. As we mentioned earlier, in the Crete Summit, 
Athens aimed at rehabilitating Milosevic and include Serbia in the regional initiatives 
succeeded in arranging a meting between Milosevic and Nano. The meeting was strongly 
criticized by Kosovar leadership and the Albanian opposition.  
Improvement of relations with Athens happened at the expense of those with Italy 
and Turkey. The opposition strongly opposed this and accused the government for selling 
the interests of the country. As examples were given the presence of a Greek military 
contingent in Albania without any clear mission, whose mandate continued to be 
extended, the grip of Greece on the Albanian economy, and the sluggish progress on the 
Corridor VIII, that was seen as vital for Albania’s development. During this period 
Greece has used the instrument of deportation of Albanian citizens very rarely.  
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